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I.  INTRODUCTION 
In this symposium dealing with nominees for the five worst Supreme 
Court decisions in that institution’s history, I have been assigned the 
unenviable task of mounting a defense for one of the most notorious.  In its 
1896 decision in Plessy v. Ferguson,1 the Court affirmed the concept of 
“separate but equal” and placed its blessing upon the legal foundations of the 
Jim Crow era which endured for much of the twentieth century (indeed, until 
the same institution saw the injustice of Plessy and reversed course in Brown 
v. Board of Education2).  When I accepted this challenge, the only saving 
grace I could see was the opportunity to square off against Akhil Amar in a 
constitutional law conference.  But after digging deeper into the decision and 
its legal and historical context, I was surprised to find myself agreeing with 
the conclusion of several noted historians that the constitutional case for the 
result reached in Plessy was arguably much stronger than the contrary result. 
This essay will be my attempt to justify this unexpected conclusion.  It 
will, in short, be a reluctant apology for the Court’s ruling in Plessy, but not 
for the way that the opinion’s author—Justice Henry Billings Brown—
seemed to go out of his way to be needlessly offensive in arriving at that 
result.  And because Professor Amar’s eloquent critique of Plessy rests 
 
     *  Professor of Law, Pepperdine University School of Law.  This essay is a response to Akhil 
Reed Amar’s Plessy v. Ferguson and the Anti-Canon presentation which was made as part of 
Pepperdine Law Review’s April 1, 2011 Supreme Mistakes symposium.  This symposium explored 
candidates for the most maligned decisions in Supreme Court history.  See Akhil Reed Amar, Plessy 
v. Ferguson and the Anti-Canon, 39 PEPP. L. REV. 75 (2011).   
 1.  163 U.S. 537 (1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 2.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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largely on the same indictment of the decision made by most modern 
commentators—that the dissenting Justice Harlan was right in seeing the 
challenged law as an official attempt to degrade and subordinate the African-
American race (a conclusion that seems undoubtedly correct), and that the 
majority wrongly sanctioned this effort—I will not address his comments in 
detail, but rather provide a general response to this charge.   
II.  HISTORICAL AND INSTITUTIONAL CONSTRAINTS 
When one reads Justice Brown’s opinion in Plessy, an ordinary person 
usually takes to it in much the same way as they take to Lady Tremaine, 
Cinderella’s wicked stepmother.  Like Lady Tremaine, Brown seems 
haughty, cold, and even cruel in telling black Americans to essentially “get 
over” any perceived slights to their humanity for being relegated to ride in 
separate railroad cars from whites.3  Indeed, it is very difficult to find much 
of anything that is nice to say about the opinion. 
Perhaps, however, with some substantial stretching, one could attempt 
to rehabilitate Justice Brown’s opinion by arguing that he was being fair-
minded in suggesting that a person with seven-eighths white blood and no 
discernible color (in other words, a virtual white man!) could still be cast 
into the black coach if Louisiana so wished;4 or that he was being helpful 
and understanding in pointing out that the law was not depriving black 
people of any property interest in their reputation, because only people of the 
dominant white race had reputations worth protecting;5 or that Brown was 
being positively fatherly in chiding black Americans for being too sensitive 
in claiming that the law marked them as inferior, when white people would 
never have felt that way had a black legislature put them in separate cars;6 or 
that he was displaying practical wisdom with his observation that “[i]f one 
race be inferior to the other socially,” there was nothing the law could do to 
make the superior race want to associate with them.7  But it seems safe to 
assume that most would not be willing to stomach such a positive spin on 
these aspects of Brown’s opinion. 
However, notwithstanding the fact that Brown seemed to go out of his 
way to be needlessly offensive and divisive in the way he reasoned Plessy, 
the Court itself appeared to reach an understandable result when the case is 
placed in the legal and historical context of the late 1800s.  For instance, in 
his comprehensive examination of the Plessy era, Michael Klarman, a noted 
historian of American civil rights laws, concludes that “the constitutional 
 
 3.  See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 549. 
 4.  Id. at 552. 
 5.  Id. at 549. 
 6.  Id. at 551. 
 7.  Id. at 551–52. 
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case for sustaining railroad segregation statutes [in Plessy] was strong, 
probably much stronger than the opposing case.”8  Moreover, according to 
Charles Lofgren, a noted historian of the Plessy litigation itself, the result in 
that case was virtually inevitable.9 
These experts reached their conclusions by situating Plessy in its proper 
historical context, and by recognizing that the institutional constraints under 
which the Court operates normally lead to decisions that reflect prevailing 
public opinion on socially-divisive matters—or at least do not push too far 
past it.  There are two main reasons for this de facto restraint on any 
progressive inclinations members of the Court might harbor.  First, 
individual Justices are part of the culture and society they live in, and more 
often than not, they share the values and worldviews of their 
contemporaries.10  Second, the Court lacks the power of the purse or a police 
force to enforce its decisions, so even if Justices are inclined to push 
progressive positions, the Court must ultimately depend on the goodwill and 
acceptance of the public to abide by its decisions.11  In short, when it comes 
to expanding protections for minority rights, the Court usually does so 
incrementally, as the law clearly supports, and as public opinion for the most 
part allows. 
And in the late 1800s, neither the law nor dominant public opinion were 
anywhere near where they needed to be to produce a ruling against 
Louisiana’s railroad segregation law.12  After the Civil War ended in 1865, 
critical amendments to the Constitution were adopted in an attempt to secure 
the rights of recently freed African-Americans, and the Reconstruction Era 
saw the South occupied and governed by Northern armies in an attempt to 
enforce those rights.13  But by the mid-1870s, the North’s will to continue 
forcing Reconstruction on the South dissipated for a number of reasons, 
including a reluctance to continue imposing antidemocratic military rule on 
it, fear of the national government’s increasing power, and a growing desire 
for national reconciliation.14 
 
 8.  Michael J. Klarman, The Plessy Era, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 303, 331. 
 9.  CHARLES A. LOFGREN, THE PLESSY CASE: A LEGAL-HISTORICAL INTERPRETATION 197–98 
(1987). 
 10.  See, e.g., MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, UNFINISHED BUSINESS: RACIAL EQUALITY IN AMERICAN 
HISTORY 83–86 (2007). 
 11.  See id. at 87–89; see also generally BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE: HOW 
PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLUENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE 
CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 12.  See generally KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 75–92. 
 13.  See id. at 53–58. 
 14.  See id. at 62. 
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The presidential election of 1876 led to a crisis when both the dominant 
Republican Party (which Lincoln had led) and the Democrats claimed to 
have carried three Southern states.15  The Republicans, who controlled all of 
the state governments in the South, gave the electoral votes to their 
candidate, Rutherford B. Hayes, making him the winner.16  Democrats 
protested and “threatened to march on Washington and reignite the Civil 
War” over the dispute, but they were more interested in regaining local 
power over the Southern state governments than securing the presidency.17  
This conflict was ultimately resolved with the Compromise of 1877, by 
which the party of Lincoln retained the White House at the cost of Northern 
troops being withdrawn from the South.18 
As a result, the Southern states reverted to self-rule and began the 
process of repealing local civil rights legislation that had been passed under 
Northern domination.19  The United States Supreme Court then added fuel to 
this fire with its 1883 ruling in the Civil Rights Cases,20 reading the 
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments in a narrow way to thwart federal 
Reconstruction Era protections for African-Americans.21  In that case, the 
Court invalidated federal civil rights laws that protected blacks from being 
discriminated against by those doing business with the public, such as 
railway carriers.22  And during this same period, race relations between 
whites and blacks in the country were deteriorating dramatically, especially 
in the South.  This was primarily the result of the political empowerment of 
poorer white Southern farmers, who blamed African-Americans for a 
number of economic and other ills.23  However, the period also witnessed a 
hardening of Northern attitudes against black Americans and an increasing 
willingness to leave Southern race relations alone to promote the 
reunification of the country.24 
 
 15.  See id. at 66. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  See id. at 65–66. 
 19.  Id. at 67. 
 20.  109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
 21.  KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 68–70. 
 22.  See The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. at 25. 
 23.  KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 80. 
 24.  Id. at 80–82.  Towards the end of the nineteenth century, Northern attitudes began to stiffen 
against African-Americans for a variety of reasons.  For one, large numbers of blacks began 
migrating north after the Civil War, which led to heightened racial anxiety and discrimination in that 
region.  Furthermore, the immigration of millions of Eastern Europeans to the region led to concerns 
about the dilution of the Anglo-Saxon race.  Moreover, the assertion of American control over 
Hawaii, Puerto Rico, and the Philippines contributed to feelings of white superiority.  Finally, the 
Republican Party’s stance on racial equality began to shift towards the end of the century because it 
was able to maintain control of the national government without securing the Southern vote, thus 
eliminating an incentive to continue fighting for black suffrage.  See id. 
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Southern states also undertook systematic and sometimes violent 
campaigns to deny African-Americans their right to vote and serve on juries, 
a campaign that was largely acquiesced in by Supreme Court decisions of 
the time.25  Indeed, as horrific as it may seem, by 1895 (the year before 
Plessy was decided) an average of over 100 African-Americans were being 
lynched each year by white Southern mobs.26 
In addition to these trends, the widespread practice in the South had long 
been to segregate whites from blacks in public facilities, including on 
railroads and in public schools.27  Segregation laws did not cause that 
practice, but were mainly added as an afterthought to give it legitimacy.28  
Further, a belief in white supremacy was approaching its zenith in both the 
North and South, spurred on by scientists of the day, who taught that 
African-Americans as a class were biologically, intellectually, and morally 
inferior to whites.29  In other words, white supremacy was generally viewed 
as an established fact of the day, a circumstance amply reflected in certain 
language that even the Great Dissenter, Justice Harlan, used in his famous 
Plessy dissent.30 
In sum, in the late nineteenth century, the formal abolition of slavery by 
the Civil War had not significantly changed the substance of racial attitudes 
among white Southerners, and the attitude of white Northerners towards 
African-Americans had hardened considerably since that conflict. 
III.  EVALUATION OF PLESSY USING MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL 
METHODOLOGY 
It was in this extremely tense racial environment that the Court was 
asked to invalidate a law, typical of the South in that period, which 
mandated separate but equal accommodations for black and white railway 
passengers.  Given the tenor of those times, the sad truth is that it is amazing 
the South was not simply mandating separate accommodations with no 
requirement of equality.  But historical conditions do not control 
constitutional decision-making, and our task is to evaluate the soundness of 
 
 25.  Id. at 64–65, 75–76, 83–85. 
 26.  Id. at 79–80. 
 27.  Id. at 78; LOFGREN, supra note 9, at 17, 180–82; Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 551 
(1896), overruled by Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 28.  See KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 89. 
 29.  Id. at 79; LOFGREN, supra note 9, at 94. 
 30.  See, e.g., Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (“The white race deems itself to be 
the dominant race in this country.  And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in education, in wealth 
and in power.  So, I doubt not, it will continue to be for all time . . . .”). 
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the Court’s interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the context of these conditions.31  One way to evaluate that 
soundness is to apply modern methods of constitutional interpretation to see 
what result they would have produced had they been used in 1896 as tools of 
decision in that case. 
If the Supreme Court were asking today whether the challenged 
Louisiana railway law violated the Equal Protection Clause, popular 
constitutional theory dictates that it should ideally consider what (at least) 
five major sources of constitutional interpretation have to say about that 
question.32  Those sources consist of arguments drawn from the 
constitutional text itself, the original or historical understanding of the 
relevant provision, key structural principles underlying the Constitution such 
as federalism or separation of powers, precedent established by prior 
decisions of the Court, and contemporary societal values or needs (otherwise 
known as constitutional policy).33  In order to apply these methods to Plessy 
to see if that Court should have done better, it must be determined what 
those sources of constitutional interpretation would have said at the time the 
case was decided. 
As to the text of the Equal Protection Clause, that provision commands 
that “[n]o State shall . . . deny to any person . . . the equal protection of the 
laws.”34  However, the idea of equality can be conceptualized in many 
different ways, and it is certainly not clear that requiring separate but equal 
accommodations for whites and blacks violated the plain language of this 
mandate.35  This may explain why, in their brief to the Court, Plessy’s 
lawyers relied primarily on the argument that the law violated the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, rather than the Equal 
Protection Clause.36  Unfortunately for them, the Court’s earlier decision in 
 
 31.  Although the Plessy Court’s analysis focused on whether the Louisiana law violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment in general, Homer Plessy’s strongest argument was based on the Equal 
Protection Clause, since the Court had essentially gutted the Privileges or Immunities Clause in the 
Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).  Hence, my analysis will focus on evaluating 
the strength of his equal protection argument at that time. 
 32.  See, e.g., Richard H. Fallon, Jr., A Constructivist Coherence Theory of Constitutional 
Interpretation, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1189, 1244–46 (1987). 
 33.  See id. 
 34.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
 35.  Accord KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 82; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 
U.S. 265, 284 (1978) (“The concept of ‘discrimination,’ like the phrase ‘equal protection of the 
laws,’ is susceptible of varying interpretations, for as Mr. Justice Holmes declared, ‘[a] word is not a 
crystal, transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color 
and content according to the circumstances and the time in which it is used.’” (citation omitted)); 
Michael J. Klarman, Race and the Court in the Progressive Era, 51 VAND. L. REV. 881, 896 (1998) 
(“‘Separate but equal’ is not obviously incompatible with ‘equal protection of the laws’ . . . .” 
(emphasis added)). 
 36.  See LOFGREN, supra note 9, at 152–62, 164–68 (citing Brief for Plaintiff in Error, submitted 
by Albion Tourgée & James C. Walker, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); Brief for Plaintiff 
in Error, submitted by S.F. Phillips & F.D. McKenny, Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)). 
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the Slaughter-House Cases,37 where that body essentially read the Privileges 
or Immunities Clause out of the Fourteenth Amendment, had made that 
argument virtually impossible to win. 
Next, as a matter of original understanding, did the framers and ratifiers 
of the Fourteenth Amendment intend the Equal Protection Clause to outlaw 
segregated facilities?  While the evidence is ultimately ambiguous, most 
historians conclude they probably did not.38  For instance, Congress 
continued to authorize segregated public school systems in the District of 
Columbia after the passage of the Fourteenth Amendment, thus evincing an 
understanding that the Equal Protection Clause was not intended to abolish 
such arrangements.39 
As to arguments from structural principles undergirding the 
Constitution, and particularly those of federalism, they would seem to have 
counseled in favor of according the Southern states a measure of deference 
in the exercise of their police powers to purportedly reduce racial friction in 
railway cars absent a clear constitutional command prohibiting this.  And as 
noted earlier, the Equal Protection Clause did not contain such a clear 
prohibition when it came to separate but equal facilities. 
As discussed earlier, with respect to relevant precedents in the law, the 
Court’s key decisions that had previously interpreted the Thirteenth and 
Fourteenth Amendments—namely the Slaughter-House Cases40 and the 
Civil Rights Cases41—were certainly not protective of minority rights.  
Moreover, lower court precedent of the day clearly supported racial 
segregation in public facilities.  Applying common law, nineteenth century 
courts generally upheld racial segregation in facilities of common carriage 
 
   37.  83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
 38.  See, e.g., KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 53–54, 82. 
 39.  See LOFGREN, supra note 9, at 180; Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551; see also Michael Klarman, An 
Interpretive History of Modern Equal Protection, 90 MICH. L. REV. 213, 252–53 (1991) (“When 
Chief Justice Warren declared in Brown that evidence of the framers’ views on school segregation 
was ‘inconclusive,’ he was being considerably less than candid.  Evidence regarding the original 
understanding of the Fourteenth Amendment is ambiguous as to a wide variety of issues, but not 
school segregation.  Virtually nothing in the congressional debates suggests that the Fourteenth 
Amendment was intended to prohibit school segregation, while contemporaneous state practices 
render such an interpretation fanciful; twenty-four of the thirty-seven states then in the union either 
required or permitted racially segregated schools.  The failure of Senator Charles Sumner’s repeated 
efforts in the early 1870s to secure congressional legislation prohibiting school segregation further 
undermines the notion that the Thirty-ninth Congress regarded that practice as constitutionally 
objectionable.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 40.  83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873). 
 41.  109 U.S. 3 (1883). 
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(such as the railroad cars in Plessy) as a reasonable measure that would 
reduce racial friction.42 
But what about the fact, one might justifiably ask, that Southern 
legislatures were almost certainly passing these separate but equal laws not 
to reduce racial friction, but rather, as the dissenting Justice Harlan argued, 
to promote an agenda of white supremacy and degrade the African-
American race?  Should not the Court have seen through that?  Perhaps it 
should have, but at that time the Court had a dominant tradition of rejecting 
direct inquiries into legislative motivation,43 which generally remains the 
law today.44  Moreover, back then the Court had not yet developed its 
modern heightened scrutiny approach for smoking out illicit legislative 
purpose. 
Finally, why did the Plessy Court not apply more of a living 
constitutionalist approach—like the Court ultimately did in Brown v. Board 
of Education45—to reach the morally correct result that Harlan urged?  The 
short answer is that American public opinion would not support official 
desegregation efforts in the South until after Brown was decided some sixty 
years later—and even then the South stiffly resisted Brown for more than a 
decade, until Northern public opinion had shifted in favor of its 
enforcement.46  Moreover, the Plessy Court was legitimately concerned that 
striking down separate but equal in railway cars would ultimately lead to 
striking it down in public schools—something that certainly would have 
provoked a violent conflagration in the South of that era (just look at what 
happened after Brown, over sixty years later).47 
In sum, even if modern methods of interpreting the Constitution had 
been applied by the Plessy Court, they almost certainly would have 
coalesced to produce the same result that the Court actually reached in that 
case.  Under such circumstances, it is no wonder how legal historians of this 
period could conclude that the decision was virtually inevitable.  As 
 
 42.  See KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 82; see also W. Chester & Phila. R.R. Co. v. Miles, 55 Pa. 
209, 215 (1867) (“[W]e are compelled to declare that, at the time of the alleged injury, there was that 
natural, legal and customary difference between the white and black races in this state which made 
their separation as passengers in a public conveyance the subject of a sound regulation to secure 
order, promote comfort, preserve the peace and maintain the rights both of carriers and 
passengers.”). 
 43.  See, e.g., McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27, 56 (1904) (“The decisions of this court from 
the beginning lend no support whatever to the assumption that the judiciary may restrain the exercise 
of lawful power on the assumption that a wrongful purpose or motive has caused the power to be 
exerted.”); see also Klarman, supra note 8, at 327. 
 44.  See, e.g., United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 383 (1968) (“It is a familiar principle of 
constitutional law that this Court will not strike down an otherwise constitutional statute on the basis 
of an alleged illicit legislative motive.”). 
 45.  347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 46.  See generally KLARMAN, supra note 10, at 157–59, 164, 177–78. 
 47.  See Klarman, supra note 8, at 399. 
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Klarman aptly observes, while the seven Justices of the Court48 who voted to 
uphold separate but equal certainly were not heroes in the way it could be 
argued that Harlan was, neither does the record support the notion that they 
were the villains described by many modern commentators.49  They were 
simply applying the prevailing law as they believed the existing social 
conditions dictated (although, in my view, Justice Brown can and should be 
convicted by the court of history for not writing the opinion in a more 
thoughtful and race-sensitive way).  In the end, it is important to recognize 
that the Plessy decision was not so much a failure of the Court, as much as it 
was a failure of our people and institutions to live up to the most basic 
principle we long ago decreed we would abide by—that all men (and 
women) are truly created equal. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Although we like to romanticize the Court as a valiant guardian of 
righteousness and justice, the truth is that it usually operates within the 
democratic commitments the People themselves have embodied in the 
Constitution.  After all, even though a truism, a majority of five lawyers 
appointed to the Court is not charged with making our fundamental law, but 
rather with interpreting what the People have deemed it will be.  And if the 
People themselves are not prepared, at any given time, to extend basic 
principles of justice embodied in the Constitution to social situations not 
clearly foreseen when adopted, then for good or ill, justice must await its 
vindication until the People are convinced of the truth of the matter.  
Although the Court can push and prod, and even on rare occasions throw 
down a marker like Brown, in the end, fundamental social change in a true 
democracy must be effected by the People, rather than judges claiming to be 
applying their law. 
 
 48.  Justice David Brewer did not participate in the decision of the case due to the untimely death 
of his daughter on the day before Plessy was to be argued at the Court.  See J. Gordon Hylton, The 
Judge Who Abstained in Plessy v. Ferguson: Justice David Brewer and the Problem of Race, 61 
MISS. L.J. 315, 315 (1991). 
 49.  See Klarman, supra note 8, at 304–05. 
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